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Abstract
We analyse the drivers of total factor productivity of Spanish banks from early 2000, 
including the last fi nancial crisis and the post-crisis period. This allows us to study changes 
in productivity following a major restructuring process in the banking sector such as the 
one experienced in Spain. Overall, we fi nd that following a period of continued growth, 
productivity declined after the height of the crisis, though large banks were less affected. We 
also fi nd that risk, capital levels, competition and input prices were important drivers of the 
differences in productivity change between banks. Finally, our results suggest that, by the end 
of our sample period, there was still some room for potential improvements in productivity 
via exploiting scale economies and enhancing cost effi ciency. These opportunities appear 
to be generally greater for the smaller banks in our sample.
Keywords: banking, cost effi ciency, crisis, scale economies, productivity.
JEL classifi cation: D24, E58, G01, G21, G28, G34.
Resumen
Este estudio analiza los determinantes de la productividad total de los factores de los 
bancos españoles desde el año 2000 hasta el período poscrisis. En particular, analizamos 
los cambios en la productividad derivados del proceso de reestructuración que ha 
experimentado el sector bancario español después de la crisis. Encontramos que, tras 
un período de continuo crecimiento, la productividad se ha reducido desde el comienzo 
de la crisis, aunque los bancos más grandes se han visto menos afectados. También 
identifi camos que el riesgo, los niveles de capital, la competencia y los precios de los inputs 
han sido determinantes muy importantes que explican las diferencias en los cambios de 
productividad entre bancos. Finalmente, nuestros resultados sugieren que, al fi nal de la 
muestra, existe margen para mejoras adicionales en la productividad, principalmente 
a través del aprovechamiento de economías de escala y de incrementos de la efi ciencia en 
costes. Identifi camos que estas oportunidades son, en general, mayores para los bancos 
pequeños en nuestra muestra.
Palabras clave: bancos, efi ciencia en costes, crisis, economías de escala, productividad.
Códigos JEL: D24, E58, G01, G21, G28, G34.
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1. Introduction  
The last global crisis changed the financial landscape, reshaped the regulation and supervision of 
banks, and motivated some major structural changes in the banking sector. Yet, after some years 
since the onset of the crisis, banks are still facing significant challenges in adapting to this new 
reality. Further to this, the persistently low interest rate environment in advanced economies, 
necessary to help support and consolidate economic growth, has put additional pressure on banks’ 
profitability. Many banks needed to restructure their strategies to be able to expand their non-
interest income sources and had to step up their efforts to reduce their operating expenses. In this 
context, several authorities, for example the European Central Bank, also suggested that the 
financial system should continue to improve cost efficiency by, among other methods,  taking 
advantage of possible economies of scale and scope via consolidation, and diversifying income 
sources (ECB, 2017).  
The Spanish banking sector has not been immune to the materialisation of the imbalances 
accumulated before the crisis. Following the crisis, the Spanish banking sector underwent a 
thorough restructuring process with, among other structural changes, a number of mergers 
coupled with the transformation of almost all saving banks into either social foundations or 
commercial banks. Further to the reduction of their balance sheets and excess debt, banks also 
had to search for more diversified income sources, review their business models and reduce 
overcapacity and operating costs. With this process still under way, a key question for the sector 
is how to sustain its productivity and, as a corollary, whether there may still be room for further 
consolidation.  
To answer these questions it is necessary to understand the underlying reasons behind the 
changes in banks’ productivity over time. This means analysing the drivers of productivity 
changes during the period prior to the crisis – when imbalances were building up – and also during 
the crisis and post-crisis periods – when significant changes to the structure and environment of 
the sector took place. Consideration of banks’ heterogeneity and their performance after a major 
restructuring process such as the one observed in Spain, is also relevant to the analysis.  
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to identify the main drivers of 
productivity change in the Spanish banking sector, before, during and after the crisis. With that 
as a basis, we study the effects of changes in productivity in different types of banks and gain 
empirical insights into whether there may still be room to achieve further gains in scale economies 
and cost efficiency. To this end, we perform a total factor productivity (TFP) decomposition 
analysis, which allows us to identify the effects of changes in the major TFP components during 
the three main stages just described. Specifically, we follow a variable cost stochastic frontier 
approach using data for Spanish banks between 2000 and 2015. 
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Another important feature to consider when studying TFP growth is the type of 
decomposition performed. Typically, previous studies of productivity in Spain decomposed TFP 
growth into technical, scale and efficiency changes; while effects stemming from equity capital, 
risk, input prices and competition were generally overlooked.  By contrast, our findings suggest 
that these factors played an important role as drivers of TFP in Spanish banks during the expansion 
period, the financial crisis and the recovery phase.  
Finally, we find that the effects of all these factors tend to be dissimilar across banks of 
different sizes. When we focus the analysis on the assessment of scale economies and cost 
efficiency, we observe that gains are still achievable at the end of our sample period in both 
aspects. Improvement opportunities appear to be generally greater for the smaller banks in our 
sample.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review of previous 
findings on TFP in the banking sector and in particular in Spain. Section 3 presents the 
methodology used. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses the main findings and results. 
Section 6 analyses some robustness exercises and finally we present the main conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review  
The majority of studies into banking productivity focus on the analysis of scale economies and 
cost efficiency. Allen and Rai (1996) are among the first authors to provide estimations of returns 
to scale accounting for economic inefficiency in the banking sector in a multi-country study. 
These authors estimate a stochastic cost frontier to a sample of 194 banks in 15 countries finding 
mixed results depending on the size of the bank. They find high scale economies in small banks 
but diseconomies of scale in large banks. Similar results were found by Berger and Humphrey 
(1997) in a survey of 130 studies that apply frontier efficiency models to the banking sector in 
more than 21 countries. Studies of European banks have also found evidence of significant scale 
economies, especially for small banks. Cavallo and Rossi (2001) and Vander Vennet (2002) 
identify room for small European banks to expand their production scale and significant 
incentives for consolidation. More recently, Fiorentino et al., (2009) assess the effects of merger 
processes in Italian and German banks. The authors find that banks enrolled in these processes in 
both countries increased their productivity mainly due to gains in scale efficiency.  
Overall, scale economies have usually been identified for small banks and mixed results 
have been found for large institutions. However, discrepancies could be due to differences in the 
specifications used for the estimations in terms of the outputs considered and the omission of risk 
and equity. Humphrey (1992) analyses the effects of using either stock or flow measures of 
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banking output. The author concludes that estimates on productivity may vary depending on the 
importance of a particular output over a period of time, while for scale economies stock measures 
provide a better fit. Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2014) provide an analysis of the inclusion of 
off-balance sheet (OBS) activities on the estimation of cost and profit efficiency and productivity 
using a broad international sample of 84 countries. Their results show that the omission of OBS 
activities affect profit productivity estimations but seem to have little effect on cost productivity. 
In the case of efficiency, this seems to affect mainly the estimations for major-advanced and 
developing economies.3 The inclusion of other non-traditional banking activities such as fee-
based services has been documented as affecting efficiency estimations by Tortosa-Ausina 
(2003), who identifies that the omission of fee-based services distorts the results when applied to 
Spanish banks. Hughes et al. (2000), and Hughes et al. (2001) show that the omission of risk-
taking in modelling bank costs would lead to misleading estimates of scale economies. This has 
also been found to be the case when equity is ignored. Hughes and Mester (2013) have identified 
the necessity of including equity in the estimations in order to avoid misspecifications. The 
authors also warn that the common measures of returns to scale may be biased given the omission 
of the cost of equity.  
2.1. Total factor productivity in the Spanish banking sector 
The productivity of the Spanish banking sector and its main components have been studied in a 
number of papers, although most of these studies have focused on investigating the effects of 
deregulation. Regarding scale economies, mixed results have been found. Altunbas and Molyneux 
(1996) assess returns to scale in the late 1980s and find major scale economies for all types of 
banks although the ones for small banks are greater. Lozano-Vivas (1998) finds no evidence of 
scale economies for commercial banks but some diseconomies for saving banks for the period 
1985-1991. Cuesta and Orea (2002) extend the period up to 1998 and find small but significant 
scale economies for Spanish banks and saving corporations during the post-deregulation period. 
These authors also study the effects of previous merger processes in Spanish banks finding that, 
although institutions involved in such processes saw a decrease in efficiency levels just after these 
processes were carried out, they recovered after 4 years at which point they started to present 
higher efficiency levels than non-merged banks.4  
Broader analysis of TFP growth has found improvements in the Spanish sector after 
deregulation. Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1997) compute TFP change using nonparametric methods 
                                                   
3 The author classify the countries in 4 groups (major-advanced, advanced, transition and developing countries). Similar 
findings for developing countries have been documented before (see Tabak and Tecles, 2010; Sarmiento and Galan, 
2017). 
4 This effect on bank efficiency after merger and acquisition processes was also recently identified in Colombian banks 
by Galán, et al (2015). 
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over the post-deregulation period (1986-1993). They identify that deregulation positively 
influenced productivity growth in both commercial and savings banks. Also, relying on 
nonparametric methods, Tortosa-Ausina et al (2008) explore the productivity growth of Spanish 
savings banks over the 1992-1998 post-deregulation period. They conclude that about 90% of 
savings banks experienced productivity growth in this period, mainly as a consequence of 
improvements in production possibilities. The remaining savings banks suffered productivity 
declines due to efficiency losses.5  
Studies using parametric methods have also found similar results. Maudos (1996) 
analyses the evolution of productivity in Spanish savings and commercial banks over the 
deregulation period 1985-94. The paper identifies high technical progress for the whole banking 
industry but positive productivity growth only for savings banks, owing to large efficiency losses 
in commercial banks. Low efficiency but high productivity growth, was also identified by 
Kumbhakar et al (2001), who examine the impact of regulatory reforms on the drivers of 
productivity of Spanish savings banks for the period 1986-1995. Their results also provide 
evidence that TFP growth was spurred on by a high rate of technical progress that outweighed the 
low efficiency present in the sector. Similarly, Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas (2005) find that 
deregulation contributes positively to TFP growth for both commercial and savings banks, though 
the importance of the effects of domestic and European deregulations was asymmetric.  
 More recent studies of TFP in the Spanish banking sector also find improvements in 
productivity driven by technical progress. Martín-Oliver et al (2013) identify intense productivity 
growth for Spanish banks in the years preceding the recent crisis. When disentangling the sources 
of this growth, they find that more than two thirds of productivity growth can be explained by the 
rapid expansion of credit to the housing market, the recourse to securitisation and short-term 
finance, a decline in liquidity holdings, and increases in the weight of hybrid instruments to the 
detriment of core capital. 
Overall, most studies assessing the effects of deregulation on the productivity of Spanish 
banks have identified positive TFP growth to be predominantly driven by technical progress 
which outweighs the efficiency losses identified, in general, for commercial banks. Nonetheless, 
most of these studies have focused on the effects of the deregulation process carried out in the 
late 1980s and to the best of our knowledge, none of them have studied the impacts of the last 
financial crisis and the post-crisis period on TFP of Spanish banks. Also, most previous studies 
of productivity in Spain decompose TFP growth into technical, scale, and efficiency changes; 
                                                   
5 When compared to other banking sectors, Spanish banks productivity has been found to be relatively lower. Pastor, 
et al (1997) use a nonparametric approach to compute the differences in productivity between banking sectors of 
different countries. They conclude that the relatively poor performance of Spanish banks is a consequence of their high 
capitalization, possibly as a prudent response to a high risk economic national environment. 
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while other effects related to equity, risk, input prices and competition are generally overlooked. 
In this paper we study a TFP decomposition taking into account all these factors, which we show 
played an important role as drivers of TFP during the expansion period, the financial crisis and 
the recovery phase. 
3. Methodology  
We follow a variable cost frontier approach to measure scale economies and decompose total 
factor productivity in the Spanish banking sector (Berger and Humphrey, 1991). This approach 
takes into account an inefficiency component in the estimation which does not allow banks to 
operate at minimum feasible costs thereby affecting their productivity. Literature on frontier 
efficiency in banking has witnessed the importance of properly identifying the inefficiency 
component in costs and profit estimations of the banking sector (Berger and Mester, 1997). In 
general, studies using frontier efficiency models have found that economic inefficiency widely 
dominates scale effects in banking (Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Grifell-Tatjéb and Lovell, 1997; 
Lozano-vivas, 1998). In this context, inefficiency is related to the excessive use of inputs and their 
inadequate allocation given the input prices and the output produced.  
The variable cost frontier is the following: 
ࢉሺ࢟ǡ࢝ǡ ݇ǡ ݎǡ ࢠǡ ݐሻ ൌ ௫ ሼ࢝࢞ݏǤ ݐǤܶሺ࢟ǡ ࢞ǡ ݇ǡ ݎǡ ࢠǡ ݐሻ ൑ Ͳǡ ݇ ൌ ݇
଴ሽǡ                      (1) 
where, ࢟ is a vector of ݉ outputs, ࢞ is a vector of ݊  inputs, ࢝ is a vector of input prices, ݇ 
represents equity capital included as a quasi-fixed input, ݎ represents a risk measure, ࢠ is a vector 
of other bank characteristics affecting the cost frontier, ݐ is a time trend variable intended to capture 
technical change, and ݑ is the cost inefficiency component.  
The estimation is performed using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) (Aigner, Lovell, and 
Schmidt, 1977). This is a parametric method which consists of decomposing the error term of an 
econometric cost function into two components: an idiosyncratic error term and a component 
capturing cost inefficiency. The specification of the cost stochastic frontier model is the 
following:  
 ܥ ൌ  ܿ ሺ࢟ǡ࢝ǡ ݇ǡ ݎǡ ࢠǡ ݐሻ ൅ ߝǢ ߝ ൌ ݒ ൅ ݑǡ                                         (2) 
where, ߝ௜௧ is an error term composed of the idiosyncratic error (ݒ௜௧), which follows a normal 
distribution and the inefficiency component (ݑ௜௧ሻ, which is assumed to follow a non-negative 
distribution.  
 Regarding equity capital, excluding it from the cost function may produce biased 
estimations of scale economies, efficiency and TFP change (Hughes and Mester, 2013). Certainly, 
if equity capital is not accounted for in the estimations, then more leveraged banks would be 
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estimated as being more inefficient than other banks facing the same the same output level and 
input prices, without recognizing the savings produced by the use of less capital. 
 Hughes et al. (2000), and Hughes et al. (2001) also provide evidence that systematic 
differences in risk between banks have significant effects on cost elasticity with respect to output. 
Therefore, the omission of risk-taking in modelling and estimating bank costs would lead to 
misleading estimates of scale economies. In fact, Hughes and Mester (2013) find that there is a 
component of scale economies related to risk-taking that remains unidentified when risk is not 
accounted for. Similarly, Kovner et al. (2014) find that it is only when controlling for risk that 
scale economies become evident in large banks. Recently, several studies on bank efficiency and 
productivity have included risk variables in the estimation. However, usually ex-post risk 
measures such as non-performing loans are included and some other studies have added more 
variables trying to capture other types of ex-ante risk such as liquidity or solvency risk. In this 
regard, we propose to follow a novel approach by including a unified composite ex-ante risk 
measure that incorporates different types of risk regarding credit, liquidity, solvency, profitability 
and the macroeconomic environment. This is performed by means of a conditional logit model, 
which estimates the occurrence of a distress event of within a two-year horizon. The specification 
of the model and the details of the variables included are presented in the Appendix. The model 
is estimated with data for the same banks in the sample we describe in more detail for our main 
model.  
 We represent the cost frontier with a translog functional form (Mester, 1993). This is a 
flexible functional form which allows the estimation of a U-shaped cost frontier avoiding some 
problems of other functional forms (e.g. Cobb-Douglas).6 The empirical estimated model is:  
 ܿ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ σ ߚ௠  ݕ௠௜௧ெ௠ୀଵ ൅ σ ߜ௡ ݓ௡௜௧ே௡ୀଵ ൅ ଵଶσ σ ߜ௡௞ݓ௡௜௧ ݓ௞௜௧ே௞ୀଵே௡ୀଵ ൅
൅ ଵଶσ σ ߚ௠௝  ݕ௠௜௧  ݕ௝௜௧ெ௝ୀଵெ௠ୀଵ ൅ σ σ ߶௠௡  ݕ௠௜௧ ݓ௡௜௧ே௡ୀଵெ௠ୀଵ ൅ ߱ͳ  ݇݅ݐ ൅
൅߱ʹ  ݇݅ݐʹ ൅ σ ߱ͳ݉  ݇݅ݐ  ݕ݉݅ݐ͵݉ ൌͳ ൅ σ ߱ʹ݊  ݇݅ݐ ݓ݊݅ݐ͵݊ൌͳ ൅ ߠଵݐ ൅ ଵଶ ߠଶݐଶ ൅
൅σ ߠଵ௠ݐ  ݕ௠௜௧ெ௠ୀଵ ൅ σ ߠଶ௡ݐ ݓ௡௜௧ே௡ୀଵ ൅ ߮ݐ  ݇݅ݐ ൅ ߣଵݎ௜௧ ൅ ଵଶ ߣଶݎ௜௧ଶ ൅
൅σ ߣଵ௠ݎ௜௧  ݕ௠௜௧ெ௠ୀଵ ൅ σ ߣଶ௡ݎ௜௧ ݓ௡௜௧ே௡ୀଵ ൅ ߰ݐݎ݅ݐ ൅ ߴݎ݅ݐ   ݇݅ݐ ൅ ࣓Ԣࢠ݅ݐ ൅ ݒ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧  
ݒ௜௧̱ܰሺͲǡ ߪ௩ଶሻǢݑ௜௧̱ܰାሺߤ௜௧ǡ ߪ௨ଶሻǡ ߤ௜௧ ൌ ࢽᇱࢎ௜௧                                       (3) 
 Linear homogeneity of the cost function is achieved by normalizing total costs and input 
prices by a chosen input price and symmetry of the cross-effects is accomplished by imposing 
ߚ௠௝ ൌ ߚ௝௠, ߜ௡௞ ൌ ߜ௞௡Ǥ Regarding the inefficiency component, we assume a truncated normal 
                                                   
6 A discussion on the advantages of a translog functional form in the estimation of scale economies in banking is 
presented in Berger and Humphrey (1992).  
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distribution where the mean is allowed to vary over banks depending on observed specific 
characteristics included in ࢎ (Battese and Coelli, 1992).  
 Following estimation, Panzar-Willig scale economies are computed as the inverse of the 
elasticity of cost with respect to output (Panzar and Willig, 1977):  
ܴܶܵ ൌ ሺσ ߲ܿ ߲  ݕ௠Τ௠ ሻିଵ,                                              (4) 
where, values of RTS greater than 1 indicate scale economies and therefore banks would benefit 
from increasing their output level given that their costs increase less than proportionally. The 
opposite is true if RTS is lower than 1 indicating diseconomies of scale. If RTS is equal to 1, then 
costs increase in the same proportion as output indicating that banks operate on an optimal scale.   
However, as previously stated, Hughes et al. (2001) and Hughes and Mester (2013) 
pointed out that the commonly used Panzar-Willig measures of returns to scale would be biased 
if the cost of equity capital were omitted in the cost function. Since the cost of equity is usually 
unobserved, they propose to compute economic cost returns to scale by adjusting the Panzar-
Willig scale economies by a factor which captures the shadow price of equity capital. We compute 
both measures of scale economies. The economic cost returns to scale are defined as: 
ܧܥܴܶܵ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߲  ܥ ߲  ݇Τ ሻሺσ ߲ܿ ߲  ݕ௠Τ௠ ሻିଵ.                           (5) 
 The stochastic frontier efficiency approach allows us to derive cost efficiency measures 
from the inefficiency component estimates. The following transformation returns values within 
the (0,1) interval, where values closer to 1 indicate higher cost efficiency: 
ܥܧ௜௧ ൌ ሺെݑ௜௧ሻ                                                        (6) 
3.1. Total Factor Productivity Growth Decomposition 
The Divisia index of productivity change in a multi-output context is defined as follows (Denny 
et al., 1981): 
ܶܨܲሶ ൌ ࢟ሶ ௣ െ ࡲሶ , where ࢟ሶ ௣ ൌ σ ܴ௠ݕሶ௠ெ௠ୀଵ and ࡲሶ ൌ σ ܵ௡ݔሶ௡ே௡ୀଵ  ,                          (7) 
where a dot over a variable indicates its rate of change, ܴ௠ ൌ ݌௠ݕ௠Ȁܴ is the revenue share of 
output ݕ௠, ݌௠ is the price of output ݉, ܴ ൌ σ ݌௠ݕ௠ெ௠ୀଵ  is total revenue, and ܵ௡ ൌ ݓ௡ݔ௡Ȁܿ is 
the cost share of input ݔ௡. After totally differentiating the cost frontier in (2) and rearranging 
terms, a decomposition of the TFP index results in (Bauer, 1990): 
ܶܨܲሶ ൌ ቂሺଵିோ்ௌሻோ்ௌ ቃ ࢿ௬ᇱ ࢟ሶ െ ࢿ௧ െ
ௗ௨
ௗ௧ െ ࢿ௞ ሶ݇ െ ࢿ௥ݎሶ െ ࢿ௭ࢠሶ ൅ ሺ࢙ െ ࢿ௪ሻᇱ࢝ሶ ൅ ሺ࢟ሶ ௣ െ ࢟ሶ ௖ሻ ,           (8) 
where, ࢿ௬ǡ ࢿ௪ǡ ࢿ௧ǡ ࢿ௞ǡ ࢿ௥and ࢿ௭ are vectors of cost elasticity with respect to outputs, input prices, 
time, equity, risk and other control variables, respectively; ݀ݑȀ݀ݐ is the rate of change of cost 
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inefficiency; ࢙ is a vector of actual input cost shares; ࢟࢖ is the revenue-weighted index of output 
as defined above, and ࢟ሶ ௖ ൌ ܴܶܵࢿ௬ᇱ ࢟ሶ  is a measure of aggregate output growth using efficient cost 
elasticity weights instead of observed revenue share weights. Therefore, the right-hand side in (8) 
represents the TFP change decomposition into the following eight components:  
x Scale efficiency change ( ሾሺͳ െ ܴܶܵሻȀܴܶܵሿࢿ௬ᇱ ࢟ሶ ): this component captures positive 
(negative) effects on productivity of moving towards (away from) the optimal scale 
(constant returns to scale). Thus, if returns to scale are equal to 1 or if output does not 
change then there is no effect of scale efficiency to TFP change. 
x Technical change (ࢿ௧): if this elasticity is greater than 0 then the cost frontier moves up 
ceteris paribus implying greater costs at the same production levels. This indicates 
technical regress and then decreases in TFP. The opposite is true when this value is lower 
than 0 and therefore productivity will raise. 
x Cost efficiency change ( ݀ݑȀ݀ݐ ): this component captures the effect of gains and 
reductions in cost efficiency on productivity. If this term is positive, then inefficiency is 
increasing and the impact on productivity is negative. On the other hand, when this term 
is negative banks are moving towards the cost efficient frontier and productivity is 
enhanced. 
x Equity capital change (ࢿ௞ ሶ݇ ): if the elasticity of costs with respect to equity is positive then 
increases of equity would decrease productivity. The opposite would occur if equity were 
reduced. 
x Risk change (ࢿ௥ݎሶ): this component measures the effect of risk on productivity. If the 
elasticity of costs with respect to risk were positive then increasing risk would imply 
decreases in TFP, while the opposite effect is produced if risk decreases or if elasticity is 
negative. 
x Other control variables change (ࢿ௭ࢠሶ ): if elasticity of costs with respect to control variables 
is greater than 0 then positive changes in these variables would imply decreases in 
productivity. The opposite effect is produced if elasticity is negative or if these variables 
present negative changes. 
x Input prices effect (ሺ࢙ െ ࢿ௪ሻԢ࢝ሶ ): this component measures the effect on productivity of 
changes in the allocation of inputs with respect to the optimal. If observed input cost 
shares are optimal or if input-prices do not change then productivity is unaffected. 
x Mark-up effect ሺ࢟ሶ ௣ െ ࢟ሶ ௖ሻ: This captures the impact on productivity change of departures 
from equiproportional mark-up over marginal cost pricing. Thus, in the presence of 
marginal cost pricing as in perfect competition ሺ࢟ሶ ௣ ൌ ࢟ሶ ௖ሻ there would not be an effect 
on productivity. 
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4. Data  
The database includes Spanish commercial and saving banks over the period 2000-2015 thus 
enabling the highly expansive period prior to the crisis and also the crisis and post-crisis years to 
be taken into consideration. We draw the bank-level data from the nonconsolidated confidential 
balance sheets and income statements as well as from the complementary files reported by banks 
to Banco de España for each bank and year. Our sample represents 90% of the total assets of 
banks and savings banks as a whole. When two banks merge, we consider that a new institution 
is created. The result of this process is an unbalanced panel composed of 50 entities over 16 years.  
We consider the bank as a multiproduct firm that combines three types of activities: 
intermediation services, financial investments and fee-based services, following the 
intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) under which banks are assumed to use 
deposits and other inputs in order to produce loans and other outputs. In particular, we consider 
as outputs i) total loans to the non-financial private sector (y1); ii) financial investments including 
debt securities other than sovereign and variable-income assets in the trading portfolio (y2); and, 
iii) fee-based services measured as the net income obtained from all services generating fees and 
commissions (y3). This output is a flow rather than a stock. On this regard, Humphrey (1992) find 
that flow measures of outputs provide useful information for productivity estimations when they 
reflect a relevant feature of the banking sector over a certain period of time. In fact, this final 
output has become more relevant in recent years and its omission has been identified as biasing 
the efficiency estimates (Tortosa-Ausina, 2003). As input prices we include: i) price of deposits, 
measured as interest expenses paid to deposits divided by total deposits (w1); ii) price of debt, 
measured as interest expenses and similar charges associated to debt certificates including bonds, 
divided by total debt (w2); iii) price of physical capital, measured as administrative expenses 
(except advertising and publicity expenses, contributions and taxes) plus depreciation and 
amortization of tangible assets divided by tangible assets (w3); and, iv) price of labour, measured 
as personnel expenses divided by the number of employees (w4);. Contrary to Modigliani-Miller’s 
theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), in the presence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, 
and asymmetric information, differences in capital structure across banks can determine 
differences in their costs of funding.7  To take this into account, we include equity capital as a 
quasi-fixed input (k). The metric of equity capital comprises Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.8  The 
production cost involves the sum of all interest and non-interest expenses. 
 
                                                   
7 Several papers provide evidence on the increment in funding costs for banks due to increases in the capital ratio (see 
Kashyap, Stein and Hanson, 2010 and Martín-Oliver et al., 2013). 
8 This includes ordinary shares, retained earnings, preferred stocks, undisclosed reserves, asset revaluation reserves, 
general provisions, general loan loss reserves, debt/equity capital instruments and subordinated term debt. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics. This table reports descriptive statistics (average, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum) of all the variables used four our models. Monetary values are in thousand euros 
of year 2010. 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loans 44,638,693  50,562,787  2,753,603  215,465,744  
Financial investments 13,321,218  20,577,447  79,405  104,183,888  
Fees and commissions income 190,812  225,932  9,033  847,832  
Deposits 40,513,738  45,216,461  2,230,888  198,111,312  
Debt 8,518,086  12,927,424  -  66,906,868  
Fixed assets 690,889  718,551  30,970  3,366,107  
Employees 7,811  7,991  1,026  33,186  
Deposits interests 786,243  953,850  61,902  5,946,642  
Debt interests 320,687  503,457  0.001  2,251,604  
Operative expenses 299,403  373,921  28,069  2,127,326  
Personnel expenses 550,619  643,087  48,941  2,513,595  
Total costs 1,956,952  2,321,684  164,380  11,447,704  
Equity capital  5,323,303  9,419,915  173,837  58,499,076  
Probability of distress 0.031 0.0843 0.000 0.858 
Non-performing loans ratio 0.044 0.059 0.003 0.320 
Liquidity ratio 0.099 0.062 0.003 0.452 
Solvency ratio 0.058 0.025 0.011 0.143 
Return on assets 0.001 0.156 -6.546 0.838 
Net interest margin 0.020 0.009 0.001 0.059 
Total assets 81,982,536  108,291,218  6,506,217  495,562,464  
 
As mentioned, we also include probability of distress at the bank level as a composite 
metric of ex-ante risk (pd). This variable is estimated according to the specification in the 
Appendix, where a description of the model and the variables used are presented. In order to 
control for possible differences associated to the ownership type we include a dummy variable 
(saving) that differentiates between commercial and saving banks.9 In this regard, it is important 
to remark that, as a consequence of the crisis, almost all saving banks were transformed into 
commercial banks or acquired by them. Finally, we include total assets (size) in order to account 
for the potential effect of bank size in cost efficiency. Certainly, previous studies have found size 
to be an important determinant of both cost and profit efficiency in the banking sector (see, 
Wheelock and Wilson, 2012; Galan et al, 2015 for some evidence). Table 1 shows a summary 
statistics of the variables used where all monetary magnitudes are expressed in constant prices of 
year 2010. 
 
5. Results  
We estimate three different models departing from the specification in Equation (3). 
Model I estimates the traditional cost frontier which does not consider equity capital or risk (that 
is, ࣓ǡ ࣅǡ ߮ǡ ߰ǡ ߴ ൌ ૙). Model II includes equity as a quasi-fixed input into the cost frontier in order 
                                                   
9 This variable is equal to 1 for saving banks and 0 otherwise. 
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to account for the effects of leverage (that is ࣅǡ߰ǡ ߴ ൌ ૙). Finally, Model III includes both equity 
and risk (that is, the full specification in Equation (3)). Table 2 shows the estimation results and 
the aggregated results for returns to scale and cost efficiency. The signs of the input prices and 
output variables are as expected. All other things being constant, expanding production, 
increasing input quantities or having to pay higher prices for inputs, increase average costs. The 
significance levels are stable across the models. Returns to scale estimates in this case indicate 
scale economies on average for the Spanish banking sector. 
Regarding the inclusion of equity capital, its effect computed from the derivative is 
positive and significant indicating that increasing equity is costly for banks in the short-run.10 
Estimations of returns to scale become greater when equity is accounted for. However, it becomes 
necessary to adjust these results by the cost of equity. Estimates of ECRTS are still positive and 
significantly greater than 1 although slightly lower than the usual RTS. This recognises that 
increasing the output level implies, to some extent, the need to raise capital, which is costly. Cost 
efficiency also increases when equity is included, implying that the higher costs, due to equity 
funding, shift the cost frontier upwards. 
Finally, the effect of the proposed composite risk metric computed from the derivative is 
also positive and significant, implying that engaging in more risk-taking increases costs. 
Nonetheless, returns to scale are greater than those in Model II, which suggests that raising the 
production scale allows banks to increase risk at lower than proportional costs. This result is in 
line with previous findings on how accounting for risk uncovers the effects of scale economies 
(Hughes and Mester, 2013; Kovner et al., 2014). In fact, Hughes and Mester (2013) find that 
controlling for risk enables identification of a strong and significant negative relationship between 
size and risk that is attributable to the benefits of diversification.11  This would imply more 
benefits in terms of scale economies for larger banks. The relationship between risk and size also 
affects banks efficiency. Recently, Sarmiento and Galan (2017) find that the effects of risk-taking 
on cost and profit efficiency vary with size.12 In fact, the relationship between size and cost 
efficiency also seems to be relevant. In all the models, size is identified as significant and 
positively related to efficiency.13  
  
                                                   
10  The delta method of convergence of transformed random variables is used to assess the significance of the 
derivatives. 
11 Demsetz and Strahan (1997) also find evidence of risk-decreasing diversification in US bank holding companies 
using an assets pricing model. 
12 In particular, the authors find large banks benefit more from taking higher credit and market risk.  
13 This result is in line with previous studies that have identified large banks as being more cost efficient than small 
banks (e.g. Wheelock and Wilson, 2012; Galan et al, 2015). 
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Table 2. Estimation results. Mean RTS and ECRTS significance levels are computed with respect to 
differences from 1 following the delta method of convergence of transformed random variables. 
Variables Model I Model II Model III 
ln y1 1.858 *** 1.361 ** 1.414 *** 
ln y2 1.061 *** 0.784 *** 0.818 *** 
ln y3 0.856 * 0.409 * 0.253 * 
ln w1 2.153 *** 2.010 *** 1.738 *** 
ln w2 0.511 ** 0.450 ** 0.406 ** 
ln w3 0.304 * 0.533 ** 0.545 *** 
ln y1 ln y1 0.300 *** 0.405 *** 0.421  
ln y1 ln y2 -0.081 *** -0.041 * -0.052 *** 
ln y1 ln y3 -0.111 ** -0.119 *** -0.125 *** 
ln y2 ln y2 0.006 * 0.005  0.006  
ln y2 ln y3 0.038 * -0.011  -0.004  
ln y3 ln y3 0.039  -0.074  -0.077 ** 
ln w1 ln w1 0.109 ** 0.115 ** 0.114 *** 
ln w1 ln w2 -0.018 ** -0.003  -0.007  
ln w1 ln w3 -0.036 *** -0.010  -0.024  
ln w2 ln w2 -0.002  -0.002 * -0.002  
ln w2 ln w3 0.048 *** 0.046 *** 0.049 *** 
ln w3 ln w3 0.010  -0.028 * -0.021  
ln y1 ln w1 -0.015  -0.033  -0.003  
ln y1 ln w2 0.075 *** 0.037  0.029  
ln y1 ln w3 -0.014  0.035  0.043  
ln y2 ln w1 0.063 *** 0.038 ** 0.030 ** 
ln y2 ln w2 -0.001  0.003  0.003  
ln y2 ln w3 -0.035 *** -0.037 *** -0.040 *** 
ln y3 ln w1 -0.091 *** 0.013  -0.028  
ln y3 ln w2 -0.039 *** -0.044 *** -0.041 *** 
ln y3 ln w3 0.076 *** -0.040  -0.034 * 
t 0.029  -0.007  -0.067  
t2 0.004 *** 0.006 *** 0.004 *** 
t ln y1 -0.004  -0.004  -0.005  
t ln y2 0.013 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 
t ln y3 -0.011 * -0.016 *** -0.017 *** 
t ln w1 -0.002  0.016 *** 0.005  
t ln w2 -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  
t ln w3 0.001  -0.009 ** -0.006 ** 
ln k   1.068 *** 1.103 ** 
ln k ln k   -0.009  -0.018  
ln k ln y1   -0.175 *** -0.159 *** 
ln k ln y2   0.009  0.008  
ln k ln y3   0.172 *** 0.167 *** 
ln k ln w1   -0.066 ** -0.045 * 
ln k ln w2   0.036 *** 0.038 *** 
ln k ln w3   0.079 *** 0.062 *** 
t ln k   0.009 ** 0.011 *** 
pd     1.634 *** 
pd2     -8.995 * 
pd ln y1     5.997  
pd ln y2     1.545  
pd ln y3     -3.582 *** 
pd ln w1     -8.144 *** 
pd ln w2     14.700 *** 
pd ln w3 1.488 
t pd -0.765 ** 
pd ln k -1.890 
saving 0.076 *** 0.070 *** 0.074 *** 
Inefficiency       
ln size -0.106 *** -0.133 *** -0.119 *** 
σu 0.105 *** 0.082 *** 0.093 *** 
log-likelihood 349.82 
 
383.21 
 
413.11 
 
Mean RTS 1.02 *** 1.04 *** 1.08 *** 
Mean ECRTS 
  
1.02 *** 1.05 *** 
Mean cost eff. 0.70   0.75   0.82   
***, ** and * refer to the value being significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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5.1. Total Factor Productivity Growth and its Decomposition 
Focusing on our preferred model that controls for equity and risk (Model III), we compute total 
factor productivity growth index as in Equation (8). Results by size of banks are presented in 
Figure 1.14 In general, TFP had been growing at a rapid pace from 2000 until the onset of the 
crisis, though large banks had experienced higher growth than small or medium-sized banks. 
Then, as a consequence of the crisis, TFP growth rates fell for all types of banks, although 
decreases were larger for small and medium-sized institutions. In the post-crisis years the majority 
of banks have started to recover their losses in productivity, although this has been more evident 
in small institutions.  
Figure 1. Evolution of TFP index over time by size of banks 
 
A decomposition of factors explaining the changes in total productivity provides further 
insights regarding the TFP changes and the differences among banks of different sizes. Figure 2 
panels (a) and (b) present this breakdown for small and large banks in terms of their contribution 
to the change in TFP, respectively. We observe that during the pre-crisis period, the main driver 
of productivity growth was technical change. This is observable for both types of banks although 
it is more important for large institutions. Martin-Oliver et al. (2013) find similar results and 
identify that this was associated with the rapid expansion of credit to the housing market and the 
                                                   
14 Banks are classified into small and large banks based on their total assets, where small banks are those below the 
25th percentile, medium banks are those between the 25th and the 75th percentile, and large banks are those above the 
75th percentile. This classification for large banks coincides with the banks identified as O-SIIs (Other Systemic 
Important Institutions) in 2017 by Banco de España (BdE, 2016) plus Banesto during the period 2000 – 2008.  
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increased usage of financial instruments such as mortgage securitizations.15 From the onset of the 
crisis, estimates of technical change have become negative, indicating that the cost frontier has 
been shifting upwards, although large banks have presented less negative technical change than 
small banks. Humphrey (1993) finds similar behaviour in the US after a restructuring process and 
argues that large banks have the ability to reduce operating costs faster via a more intensive use 
of branch offices. Their typically larger branch networks can be cut back or restructured.  
In general, during the pre-crisis period, cost efficiency was also an important positive TFP 
growth driver among all types of banks. Competition might have played an important role in 
promoting efficiency improvements. Certainly, Casu and Girardone (2006) identify that increased 
competition forced European banks to become more efficient during the early 2000s. With the 
onset of the crisis banks faced a negative shock to their output, which suddenly shifted the frontier 
upwards leading to temporary gains in efficiency in the early stage of the crisis. Later, the excess 
capacity faced by banks and the restructuring process brought about reductions in cost efficiency. 
In the recovery phase, efficiency gains have been coming back, especially for large banks, which 
had previously been found to have the ability to reduce operating costs more quickly than small 
banks (Humphrey, 1993).  
The importance of scale efficiency change as a productivity driver has been more limited, 
although important differences are observed between small and large banks. During the credit 
expansion years, it contributed negatively to the productivity of small banks while the effect was 
positive for large banks. This may suggest that, during the pre-crisis period, the expansion of 
capacity in small banks led to higher increases in costs than the increases obtained in output 
volume. Then, following the crisis the role of scale efficiency as a driver of productivity has been 
almost negligible in comparison to other components. We further extend this analysis in more 
detail below in order to reach conclusions regarding the current situation of returns to scale of 
Spanish banks.  
The effect of equity capital is, in general, negative on productivity change during the 
whole period, which is related to the cost of equity as a funding source. During the pre-crisis this 
effect is more evident for large banks, suggesting that they increased equity in a greater proportion 
than small banks, possibly as a consequence of a more rapid output growth. Then, from the onset 
of the crisis, banks had to make additional efforts to raise equity capital, which seems to have 
affected small banks more, probably due to these types of banks facing higher costs of funding 
via equity. 
                                                   
15 Mortgage securitisation in Spain between 2000 and 2007 grew at annual rates greater than 40% on average (BdE, 
2017c). 
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Figure 2. Decomposition of TFP growth and its evolution over time 
Panel (a): Small banks 
 
Panel (b): Large banks 
 
 Regarding risk, the effect on TFP growth becomes relevant just before the crisis when the 
vulnerabilities that had built up during the expansion years started to materialise.16 This effect 
was greater for large banks, which may have engaged in more risk-taking. Reasons for this vary 
from the incentives associated with too-big-to-fail effects (Bertay et al., 2013) to the higher risk 
                                                   
16  Engaging in more risky activities have also been previously documented to be a consequence of increasing 
competition in Spanish banks (Salas and Saurina, 2003). Nonetheless, this relationship has been found to depend on 
the degree of concentration (Jimenez et al., 2013). 
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implied by their activities and business models such as greater complexity, higher leverage, and 
less-stable funding (Laeven et al., 2014). Around 2010, risk decreases and it leads to TFP growth 
for all banks, however, during the sovereign crisis risk increases again affecting productivity 
negatively. During the post-crisis years, risk has substantially decreased, which, in terms of 
productivity, has benefited large banks more.  
With regard to competition, the mark-up component relating to the ability of banks to set 
output prices above those in perfect competition shows mixed effects in TFP among banks. 
Nonetheless, its net effect appears to be negative during the expansion years. This suggests that 
the increase in competition during that period forced banks to reduce output prices. During the 
crisis, the restructuring processes in the sector, mainly via consolidation, allowed banks to exploit 
output prices and obtain benefits from this in terms of TFP growth. In this regard, the mark-up 
component suggests that small banks have benefited more from this in recent years. This may 
indicate that consolidation processes have allowed small banks to take advantage of increases in 
output prices, while for large banks the margin to increase them has been more limited. 
Input prices exhibit mixed results although they had a clear positive effect on banks 
productivity during 2007 and 2008 just prior to the financial crisis in Spain. From the onset of the 
crisis, the change in input prices has been mainly driven by the decrease in the price of deposits 
as a consequence of the low interest rate environment. This seems to have benefited banks during 
the last years of the crisis. However, it has had negative effects on productivity in the last two 
years of our sample period. This can be related to the compression of net interest margins (BDE, 
2017b). Small banks have been more affected by this, probably as a result of larger banks having 
greater access to funding sources other than deposits, and benefitting from lower funding costs 
(Laeven et al., 2014).  
 Finally, results suggest that the broad transformation process of savings banks into 
commercial banks, as a consequence of the crisis, has been a relevant positive productivity driver 
for those institutions. A definite impact on TFP growth is observed around 2010 when the largest 
part of this restructuring process was carried out.  
5.2. Is there room for improvements in efficiency and exploiting scale economies?  
The renewed concerns regarding the low profitability of banks in Europe have opened questions 
regarding the scope for enhancing both operating cost and scale efficiency in the banking sector 
(ECB, 2017). Spain has not been immune to this environment and the possibility of improving 
profits through cost and scale efficiency remains important (BdE, 2017a). Against this 
background, we analyse cost efficiency and returns to scale of Spanish banks in more detail. 
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Figure 3. Scale economies by size of banks. 
 
 
The differences found between banks of different sizes in terms of TFP, suggest the 
convenience of analysing scale economies and cost efficiency while differentiating by bank size. 
Figure 3 exhibits estimations of returns to scale by size of banks. It is observed that opportunities 
for scale economies were increasing gradually between 2000 and 2007. This may suggest that the 
rapid expansion of their capacity during this period of large credit growth allowed them to exploit 
scale economies. Following the crisis, the thorough restructuring process of the Spanish banking 
sector opened new opportunities for scale economies. In the last two years of our sample period, 
these opportunities have started to be seized, mainly by medium-sized and large banks. This has 
increased heterogeneity between small and large institutions during the post-crisis period. 
Overall, increasing returns to scale are identified for all types of banks, although scale economies 
opportunities have increased more extensively for small banks and remain higher for these 
institutions.  
Mirroring some of the dynamics observed in scale economies, cost efficiency also 
increased during the pre-crisis period (Figure 4). This could be an effect of the increase in 
competition which was more evident for small and medium-sized banks, given that such 
institutions had more room for improvement (Casu and Girardone, 2006). As stated previously, 
size has a significant positive effect on cost efficiency and large banks exhibited higher efficiency 
throughout the period under examination. Subsequently, with the onset of the crisis, cost 
efficiency stalled for large and medium-sized banks and decreased for small institutions. 
Certainly, small banks seem to have been more affected by the excess of capacity once the crisis 
arrived, suggesting that these types of banks are less able to cut costs rapidly (Humphrey, 1993). 
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In the last two years of our sample period, cost efficiency has been recovering as a consequence 
of the large reduction of branches (more than 30% from 2008; BdE, 2017b) and the benefits of 
synergies derived from merger processes. This increase in efficiency has been more evident for 
large banks, which have been more involved in both strategies. All this suggests that while there 
is still scope for possible improvements in cost efficiency for all banking groups, currently, 
opportunities appear to be greater for small banks.  
Figure 4. Cost efficiency by size of banks. 
 
5.3. Robustness 
We assess the robustness of the estimates of coefficients and, in particular, of scale economies, 
efficiency and TFP change to the identification of merged banks; the effects of the crisis; the 
inclusion of cooperative banks; and to controlling for the restructuring processes of loan losses 
experienced by some important institutions in Spain after the crisis.  
Merged banks  
The restructuring process of the Spanish banking sector after the crisis has implied several merger 
and takeover processes. Thus, exploring potential differences in terms of cost efficiency and 
productivity between merged and non-merged banks is of interest. For this purpose we estimate 
Model IV where we include a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for merged banks and 0 
otherwise. We include this variable both in the cost frontier and in the inefficiency component. 
That is, in Equation (3) we add an extra variable in vectors ࢠ and ࢎ. Results of the estimation are 
presented in Table 3. We observe that this variable is highly significant both as a cost frontier 
shifter and as an efficiency driver. In the former case, the effect is positive on costs, implying that 
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merged banks have a more expensive cost structure in the short-run. Nonetheless, the effect is 
also positive on efficiency, which implies that merged banks tend to be more efficient than non-
merged institutions. This result has also been observed before in empirical applications, and the 
greater efficiency has been linked to better management practices and the benefits of synergies 
(Cuesta and Orea, 2002; Galán et al., 2015).  
However, the benefits of new mergers may not be immediate. Previous studies have 
identified some negative effects of mergers in the short-run in terms of efficiency that may lead 
to further reductions in productivity (see Amel et al., 2004, for a review). However, Cuesta and 
Orea (2002) and Galán et al. (2015) have found that although reductions in efficiency are 
presented immediately after these processes are carried out, around 4 years later the new merged 
institutions catch up and start to present higher efficiency levels than those of non-merged 
institutions. Humphrey (1993) also finds that merger processes in the US led to negative technical 
change in the short-run given that branch networks of merged banks might be consolidated within 
overlapping market areas. 
The crisis: 
The most recent global financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis had severe 
consequences for the Spanish banking sector. Banks faced an unusual situation of accelerated 
increases in NPL, lack of liquidity and solvency concerns which reached its peak in 2012. Credit 
also dropped dramatically and banks were suddenly immersed in a situation of overcapacity. In 
order to explore whether the cost structure faced by banks was different during this period and 
whether it affects the estimated results, we estimate Model V including a dummy variable in 
vectors ࢠ and ࢎ of Equation (3). This variable is equal to 1 for the crisis years and 0 otherwise. 
Results are presented in Table 3. The crisis variable is not found to be significant as a cost frontier 
shifter, suggesting that the crisis did not imply a change in the cost structure of banks and that the 
effects are already captured by the other variables in the model. However, it had a negative effect 
on cost efficiency, which may be the consequence of the excess of capacity of banks and the 
effects of the restructuring processes of the sector. However, as has been stated previously, the 
effects of the crisis on efficiency have been highly heterogeneous among banks of different sizes. 
Overall, estimates of both, returns to scale and cost efficiency before the crisis are lower than 
those envisaged following the onset of the crisis. This is consistent with our findings using Model 
III, where we observe that banks increased their production scale during the credit expansion 
period by exploiting scale economies, while after the crisis the reduction of outputs opened new 
opportunities to obtain gains from increasing the production scale.  
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Table 3. Estimation results of additional models, first order regression coefficients. Complete 
results are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. Mean ECRTS significance levels are computed with 
respect to differences from 1 following the delta method of convergence of transformed random variables. 
Variables Model IV 
M&A 
Model V 
Crisis 
Model VI 
Cooperatives 
Model VII 
SAREB 
ln y1 1.602 *** 1.460 *** 1.056 *** 1.885 *** 
ln y2 0.570 *** 0.785 *** 0.424 ** 0.946 *** 
ln y3 0.653 * 0.340 * 0.107  0.465 * 
ln w1 2.094 *** 2.200 *** 2.013 *** 2.250 *** 
ln w2 0.142 * 0.485 *** 0.085 * 0.361 ** 
ln w3 0.457 *** 0.577 *** 0.311 *** 0.444 ** 
t 0.049  -0.044  -0.039  -0.048  
ln k 1.057 *** 1.063 *** 1.003 *** 1.119 *** 
pd 1.644 *** 1.577 *** 1.195 *** 1.982 *** 
saving 0.046 *** 0.082 *** 0.075 *** 0.093 *** 
M&A 0.313 ***       
crisis   -0.015      
cooperatives     0.065 **   
SAREB       -0.074 *** 
Inefficiency         
ln size -0.040 ** -0.126 *** -0.159 *** -0.103 *** 
M&A -0.456 ***       
crisis   0.071 ***     
SAREB       0.0239  
σu 0.113 *** 0.092 *** 0.176 *** 0.094 *** 
log-likelihood 416.73  401.52  394.81  410.85  
Mean ECRTS 1.07 *** 1.04 *** 1.10 *** 1.06 *** 
Mean cost eff. 0.81   0.86   0.66   0.86   
***, ** and * refer to the value being significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Cooperative banks: 
Cooperative banks are financial entities that belong to its members and are usually deeply rooted 
within local areas and communities as well as being involved in social activities. In Spain 
cooperative banks are important players in the financial system and although their size is smaller 
than that of commercial and savings banks, some of them expanded their business significantly 
during the years prior to the crisis. After the crisis the sector has also been involved in 
reorganization processes characterized by mergers and acquisitions that have reduced the number 
of cooperatives but have also created a couple of entities comparable in size to that of some 
commercial banks. Empirical evidence from previous studies suggest that these types of entities 
are less cost efficient than commercial banks but their lower risk exposure provided them with 
greater resilience to the recent financial crisis (see, ILO, 2013; NEF, 2013).17 Thus, we explore 
whether or not involving cooperative banks in the cost estimation would change the results, in 
particular for commercial and saving banks by estimating Model VI.  
 Results in Table 3 show that scale economies are higher and efficiency is lower on 
average when cooperatives are included in the sample, suggesting that cooperative banks present 
greater opportunities to expand their production scale but that this business model tends to be less 
                                                   
17 As an example, based on information by the National Union of Credit Cooperatives (UNACC), in Spain commercial 
and saving banks employ 8 workers per €100 million of assets while this proportion rises to 12 in cooperative banks.  
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cost efficient. However, estimates of RTS and cost efficiency for commercial and savings banks 
are similar to those obtained under Model III. 
SAREB: 
The Management Company for Assets Arising from the Banking Sector Reorganisation (SAREB) 
is an entity founded in 2012 to manage bad assets from banks. Its aim is to help clean up the 
sector, allowing banks with a high number of nonperforming assets to transfer them to SAREB. 
These transfers added up to 51 billion Euros and aided banks in mitigating risk and reducing costs 
associated with the management of such assets. Thus, SAREB could have effects on cost 
efficiency and the TFP of these banks. To explore this, we estimate Model VII where we include 
a dummy variable taking a value equal to 1 for those banks transferring assets to SAREB from 
the dates of the transfers and 0 for the remaining banks and dates. We include this variable both 
in the cost frontier and in the inefficiency component. Estimation results in Table 3 show that the 
SAREB dummy is not significant as an efficiency driver but it is found to have a significant 
negative impact on costs, which confirms the gains in banks’ cost reductions due to the transfer 
of nonperforming assets to SAREB. Consequently transferring NPLs to SAREB produced a 
beneficial positive impact on TFP in those banks (see Figure A1 in the Appendix).18  
Profit efficiency 
Finally, we consider it interesting to check to what extent cost efficiency is related to profit 
efficiency as well as to examine the role of risk on bank profits. For this purpose we estimate an 
alternative variable profit frontier efficiency model, which considers output quantities and input 
prices as exogenous in the cost function (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997). This allows us to hold the 
same specification in Equation (3) but changes the dependent variable for a profit measure and 
the sign preceding the inefficiency component (the sign becomes negative given that now we have 
a maximum instead of a minimum frontier). We use net interest margin and return on assets as 
profit measures in order to avoid the problem of using logarithms with variables that may take 
negative values such as net profits. In fact, the use of net profits is still controversial in the profit 
efficiency literature given that the techniques used to solve this issue may introduce biases (see, 
Bos and Koetter, 2011, for a discussion).  
The estimation results are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix, where it is observed 
that similar conclusions can be derived from both models regardless of the profitability measure 
used. A negative and significant effect is found for equity, which suggests that raising equity 
capital reduces profits. Regarding risk, a positive sign is found, indicating that engaging in more 
risk-taking increases profits. Size is also found to have significant positive effects on profit 
                                                   
18 In Figure A1 it is observed that banks transferring bad assets to SAREB experienced an earlier reduction of risk and 
consequently an earlier recovery of TFP than other banks. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1912
 
efficiency. Thus, as in the case of cost efficiency, large banks are more profit efficient than small 
institutions. Recently, Sarmiento and Galán (2017) also find evidence of a positive relationship 
between size and profit efficiency in Colombian banks, which is augmented by the effects of risk-
taking.  
 
6. Conclusions  
The Spanish banking sector has undergone a significant transformation in the last 15 years. 
Following a period of increasing financial integration but also of growing imbalances both on a 
domestic and European level, the financial crisis led to a sharp reduction of the number of 
institutions in Spain: from 52 to 20 between 2007 and 2014. This new landscape has drawn the 
attention both of researchers and policy makers on the conjunctural and structural challenges 
regarding the sustainability of the banking sector. At the heart of these challenges lie the questions 
on how productive the sector is, the factors explaining it and the prospects for the future. 
To help answer these questions, we perform a complete TFP decomposition and identify 
the main drivers of productivity growth in Spanish banks between 2000 and 2015. The 
specification of the estimated stochastic cost frontier accounts for observed time-varying 
inefficiency heterogeneity and allows us to consider the effects of equity and risk-taking on banks’ 
cost structures. To capture effects from risk-taking, we propose a composite ex-ante risk metric 
which is able to capture different sources of risks such as credit risk, liquidity, solvency, 
profitability and macroeconomic conditions.  
We find that TFP increased notoriously during the years of credit expansion before the 
crisis.  Main drivers during this period were technical change and cost efficiency improvements, 
which in turn were related to the innovation in financial instruments (Martin-Oliver et al., 2013) 
and increasing competition in the sector (Casu and Girardone, 2006). This trend reversed during 
the crisis period, when the imbalances accumulated in previous years started to materialise in 
rapid increases of non-performing loans and deterioration of liquidity, solvency and profitability 
indicators. Afterwards, during the post-crisis period, productivity gradually started to recover, 
mainly due to the reduction of risk and improvements in efficiency. 
In addition, we find significant heterogeneity among banks of different sizes, not only in 
TFP growth but also in terms of its drivers. Large banks have taken advantage of scale economies 
and benefited more from technical change during the pre-crisis period, which allowed them to 
present higher TFP growth rates than small institutions. Once the crisis hit, productivity change 
in large banks was more sensitive to variations in risk, but the net effect of the crisis was less 
severe than for small banks, which suffered an important decrease in efficiency. In the recovery 
phase, the reduction of risk and efficiency gains have been the main positive drivers of 
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productivity, particularly for large banks. The mark-up component has also contributed positively 
to TFP of small banks in the post-crisis years while input prices have affected them negatively. 
In general, the negative effect of raising equity capital has been more limited as a TFP driver; 
however, its effect has become more important since the last years of the crisis, especially for 
small banks. Finally, the transformation of savings banks into commercial banks had positive 
effects on TFP since the cost structure of saving banks was identified to be relatively more 
expensive. 
Our analysis also suggests that, since the onset of the crisis, the reduction of banks’ output 
and the restructuring process have brought new opportunities for exploiting scale economies and 
enhancing cost efficiency. Some of these opportunities were seized in the last two years of our 
sample period by almost all types of banks, particularly as result of the consolidation process 
which followed the crisis. Overall, our results suggest that, by the end of our sample period, there 
would still be room for further potential improvements in productivity via exploiting scale 
economies and enhancing cost efficiency in the system. These opportunities appear to be greater 
for the smaller banks in the sample.  
Our results are robust with respect to the effects of the crisis, possible differences between 
merged and non-merged banks, the inclusion of cooperative banks, profit efficiency 
considerations, and other adjustments regarding the reorganization process of banks’ assets after 
the crisis. Yet, we should bear in mind that the period we cover is truly extraordinary as it includes 
one of the major banking crises in history and a wide-ranging restructuring process which 
followed afterwards. While, in our view, such a context provides unique questions for research, 
it also creates logical challenges for any empirical study covering such diverse and complex 
dynamics. We hope this paper provides reasonable insights into the drivers of productivity in the 
Spanish banking sector and serves as a useful basis for future analysis on this subject. 
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Appendix.  
The probability of distress model 
       
We obtain a composite ex-ante risk measure by means of the estimation of the following conditional logit 
model: 
 
ܲሺܦ௜௧ା௛ ൌ ͳȁ࢞௜௧ǡ ܦ௜௧ ൌ Ͳሻ ൌ ܮ݋݃݅ݐሺ࢞௜௧ȁǡ ܦ௜௧ ൌ Ͳሻǡ 
where, D is a binary variable representing the occurrence of a distress event within a two-year horizon. The 
occurrence of a distress event is defined as the intervention of a bank, its need of recapitalization with public 
funds, or capital needs derived from stress tests; ࢞ is a vector of bank characteristics and macroeconomic 
factors including the following variables:  
i. total assets, included in logs;  
ii. NPLs, measured as the ratio of non-performing loans from governments, credit institutions and 
other sectors to total loans;  
iii. the annual growth rate of the NPL ratio;  
iv. liquidity ratio, computed as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, where liquid assets are defined 
as cash and balances with central banks and debt securities issued by resident and non-resident 
governments;  
v. solvency ratio, computed as CET1 capital divided by total assets, where CET1 capital includes 
ordinary shares, noncumulative preferred stock and disclosed reserves;  
vi. net interest margin, measured as the ratio of net interest income to earning assets;  
vii. the annual real GDP growth rate; and,  
viii. the annual growth rate of short-run nominal interest rates. 
The probability of distress (pd), used as a composite ex-ante risk measure, is a prediction of the 
probability of a bank experiencing an event of distress, as defined above, within the following two years. 
Results of estimations are available upon request. 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 31 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1912
 
Table A1. Estimation results of additional models. 
Variables Model IV 
M&A 
Model V 
Crisis 
Model VI 
Cooperatives 
Model VII 
SAREB 
ln y1 1.602 *** 1.460 *** 1.056 *** 1.885 *** 
ln y2 0.570 *** 0.785 *** 0.424 ** 0.946 *** 
ln y3 0.653 * 0.340 * 0.107  0.465 * 
ln w1 2.094 *** 2.200 *** 2.013 *** 2.250 *** 
ln w2 0.142 * 0.485 *** 0.085 * 0.361 ** 
ln w3 0.457 *** 0.577 *** 0.311 *** 0.444 ** 
ln y1 ln y1 0.292  0.423 *** 0.502 *** 0.488 *** 
ln y1 ln y2 -0.014  -0.056 *** -0.067 *** -0.073 *** 
ln y1 ln y3 -0.140 *** -0.138 *** -0.174 *** -0.170 * 
ln y2 ln y2 -0.004  0.006  0.006 * 0.009 * 
ln y2 ln y3 -0.021  0.000  0.008  0.014  
ln y3 ln y3 -0.038  -0.064 * -0.024  -0.035  
ln w1 ln w1 0.126 *** 0.179 *** 0.160 ** 0.161 ** 
ln w1 ln w2 0.003  -0.007  -0.010  -0.001  
ln w1 ln w3 -0.027 *** -0.025  -0.023  -0.023  
ln w2 ln w2 -0.001  -0.002 * -0.002  -0.001  
ln w2 ln w3 0.054 *** 0.050 *** 0.051 *** 0.054 *** 
ln w3 ln w3 -0.045 *** -0.023  -0.013  -0.022  
ln y1 ln w1 -0.029  -0.004  -0.024  -0.055  
ln y1 ln w2 0.001  0.034  0.034  0.041  
ln y1 ln w3 0.007  0.056  0.082 ** 0.066  
ln y2 ln w1 0.023 *** 0.025  0.042  0.048 ** 
ln y2 ln w2 0.004  0.003  0.007 * 0.003  
ln y2 ln w3 -0.036 *** -0.041 *** -0.043 *** -0.043 *** 
ln y3 ln w1 0.016  -0.025  -0.002  0.002  
ln y3 ln w2 -0.035 *** -0.046 *** -0.052 * -0.049 ** 
ln y3 ln w3 -0.058 *** -0.045 * -0.064 *** -0.060 * 
t 0.049  -0.044  -0.039  -0.048  
t2 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.00465 *** 0.005 *** 
t ln y1 -0.016 *** -0.004  -0.00842  -0.009  
t ln y2 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.0113 *** 0.013 *** 
t ln y3 -0.003  -0.017 *** -0.0162 *** -0.013 * 
t ln w1 0.011 *** 0.010 * 0.0109 * 0.011  
t ln w2 -0.002  -0.004 ** -0.00366  -0.003  
t ln w3 -0.003  -0.007 ** -0.0106 *** -0.007 * 
ln k 1.057 *** 1.063 *** 1.003 *** 1.119 *** 
ln k ln k -0.055 ** -0.025  -0.0175  -0.010  
ln k ln y1 -0.061 ** -0.138 *** -0.164 *** -0.162  
ln k ln y2 -0.001  0.008  0.017  0.015  
ln k ln y3 0.151 *** 0.156 *** 0.157 *** 0.154 *** 
ln k ln w1 -0.057 ** -0.038  -0.0494  -0.034  
ln k ln w2 0.053 *** 0.044 *** 0.0397 ** 0.034 ** 
ln k ln w3 0.103 *** 0.060 *** 0.0475  0.057 ** 
t ln k 0.008 *** 0.011 *** 0.0127 *** 0.010 *** 
pd 1.644 *** 1.577 *** 1.195 *** 1.982 *** 
pd2 -4.561  -11.650 ** -3.776  -5.117  
pd ln y1 9.699 *** 5.477  3.335  6.982 * 
pd ln y2 -1.395  1.995  3.355  -0.346  
pd ln y3 -4.338 * -2.441  -2.532  -4.315 * 
pd ln w1 -7.914 *** -7.711 *** -12.23  -8.214  
pd ln w2 13.25 *** 11.770 *** 18.85  11.95 ** 
pd ln w3 5.051 *** 0.969  2.902  2.166  
t pd -0.646 -0.370 -0.939 -0.521  
pd ln k -2.814 -2.563 -4.179 -2.024  
saving 0.046 *** 0.082 *** 0.075 *** 0.093 *** 
M&A 0.313 ***       
crisis   -0.015      
cooperatives     0.065 **   
sareb       -0.074 *** 
Inefficiency  ln size -0.040 ** -0.126 *** -0.159 *** -0.103 *** 
                     M&A -0.456 ***       
                     crisis   0.071 ***     
                     sareb       0.024  
***, ** and * refer to the value being significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
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Figure A1.  TFP growth decomposition of banks transferring nonperforming assets to SAREB 
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Table A2. Results of profit efficiency models. 
Variables Model VIII - NIM Model IX - ROA 
ln y1 0.0145 *** 0.0160 *** 
ln y2 0.0548 *** 0.0601 *** 
ln y3 0.1050  0.1140  
ln w1 -0.0428 *** -0.0470 *** 
ln w2 -0.0372 * -0.0410 * 
ln w3 -0.0776  -0.0850  
ln y1 ln y1 -0.0060 * -0.0056 ** 
ln y1 ln y2 0.0049 *** 0.0064 ** 
ln y1 ln y3 -0.0044  -0.0039  
ln y2 ln y2 -0.0015 *** -0.0007 ** 
ln y2 ln y3 -0.0010  -0.0001  
ln y3 ln y3 0.0046  0.0061 * 
ln w1 ln w1 -0.0007  0.0002  
ln w1 ln w2 -0.0009  0.0001  
ln w1 ln w3 -0.0010  0.0000  
ln w2 ln w2 0.0000  0.0010  
ln w2 ln w3 0.0017  0.0029  
ln w3 ln w3 -0.0007  0.0002  
ln y1 ln w1 0.0047  0.0062  
ln y1 ln w2 0.0049  0.0063  
ln y1 ln w3 -0.0082 ** -0.0081 * 
ln y2 ln w1 -0.0048  -0.0043  
ln y2 ln w2 -0.0003  0.0007  
ln y2 ln w3 0.0011  0.0022  
ln y3 ln w1 0.0020  0.0032  
ln y3 ln w2 -0.0025  -0.0017  
ln y3 ln w3 0.0039  0.0053  
t 0.0030  0.0030  
t2 -0.0002  -0.0002 * 
t ln y1 -0.0014  -0.0005  
t ln y2 0.0002  0.0012  
t ln y3 0.0007  0.0017 * 
t ln w1 -0.0008  0.0002  
t ln w2 -0.0003  0.0006  
t ln w3 0.0008 ** 0.0019  
ln k -0.0904 * -0.0990 ** 
ln k ln k -0.0001  0.0009  
ln k ln y1 0.0091  0.0111  
ln k ln y2 -0.0023 ** -0.0015 * 
ln k ln y3 -0.0033  -0.0026  
ln k ln w1 0.0004  0.0015  
ln k ln w2 -0.0006  0.0004  
ln k ln w3 -0.0002  0.0008  
t ln k 0.0005  0.0015  
pd 5.1430 *** 5.6060 *** 
pd2 1.0320  1.1362  
pd ln y1 0.0001  0.0011  
pd ln y2 0.1940 * 0.2144 ** 
pd ln y3 0.0134  0.0157  
pd ln w1 -0.3600  -0.3950  
pd ln w2 -0.3850  -0.4225  
pd ln w3 0.1150  0.1275  
t pd -0.1360 *** -0.1486 ** 
pd ln k 0.0021 0.0033 
saving  0.0010 0.0010 
Inefficiency     
ln size -0.00318 ** -0.003 ** 
σu 0.0394 *** 0.0425 *** 
log-likelihood 1293.48 
 
1319.3 
 
Mean profit eff. small banks 0.81 0.80 
 
                          medium banks 0.88 0.88 
 
                          large banks 0.91   0.92   
***, ** and * refer to the value being significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
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